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ow will Brexit influence the UK’s transparency regime 
and how, in turn, will openness shape the UK’s Brexit 
process? There are three ways of looking at how Brexit 
may influence open government in the UK: through possible 
changes to old policies and the pushing of new ones, through the 
new Prime Minister championing transparency or supporting 
secrecy, and the openness of the Brexit process itself, which so 
far has seen a struggle between the executive’s secretive 
prerogative powers and the legislature’s rights to know.  
How will Brexit influence open government and how will 
openness influence Brexit? In June 2016, the UK voted 51% to 
48% to leave the European Union and in the wake of the vote 
Britain had a new Prime Minister and a new government. 
However, despite the promises of the new government the exact 
process of leaving the EU, as set out in article 50 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, remains unclear and has become increasingly contentious. 
What appeared a relatively clear process has become opaque and 
contested.  
If transparency is now the “dramatically satisfying answer to every 
crisis and question about the state” (Fenster 2015) what is its 
place in the UK’s Brexit process, perhaps the greatest crisis 
Britain has faced since the Second World War? There are three 
ways of looking at how Brexit may influence open government in 
the UK: through changes to old and new policies, the influence of 
the new Prime Minister and the openness of the Brexit process 
itself.  
§ 1 –  OPEN POLICIES OLD AND NEW? 
David Cameron pledged to make the UK the most open 
government in the world. In common with other countries, the 
UK already has an emerging transparency “ecosystem” that May 
inherits (Kreimer 2008: Richards and Smith 2015). A shifting 
mixture of openness instruments, technology and accountability 
have together created a flourishing openness ecosystem where 
FOI laws sit alongside more dynamic, “hybrid” and less 
controlled instruments, from social media to mass leaks (Birchall 
2014, 84: Kreimer 2008). The combination of formal and 
informal tools, pushed by a range of bodies, is creating a 
“permanent” and “continuous” oversight of government which 
can be used by potential “veto wielders” to exercise “counter-
democratic control” (Schudson 2015, 237).  
H 
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However, given the continuous conflict and uncertainty, most 
openness regimes exist in a constant state of change and flux as 
legal rulings, political reforms and diverse use re-shape the 
boundaries of the laws. Taken together, divergent pressures 
frequently leads to a continuous series of attempts to “dismantle” 
or “expand” information regimes, sometimes working in parallel 
(see Knill et al. 2012: Worthy 2017). Proposed changes have a 
“magnetic” effect and cluster together but attempts to either 
extend or curtail openness regimes frequently run up against the 
forces of symbolism, complexity and resistance that shaped laws 
in the first place. 
May’s administration has set to continue the UK’s push towards 
greater openness with a series of policies, stretching from private 
sector accountability to a data-based audit of the equality of 
institutions. This fits with a pattern that new governments often 
promote openness to set a tone. Self-consciously “reforming” 
administrations in the UK in 1997 and then in 2010, the US in 
2009 and Italy in 2013 all made transparency a priority. Openness 
represents an easy win to a new leader as it “signals” a whole set 
of messages: that a government is prepared to be open and 
“democratic” and is prepared to be monitored or overseen by the 
public (Worthy 2017). This may be especially important for Prime 
Minister without a mandate facing the complications of Brexit. 
Change may come from alterations to existing policies or the 
creation of new ones.   
§ 2 –  THE EXISTING ECOSYSTEM: FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION AND OPEN DATA 
Post-Brexit, on the surface, nothing changes to the main legal 
instruments of Britain’s openness regime. The key piece of 
openness legislation, the Freedom of Information Act 2000, is 
enshrined in UK law and very unlikely to be repealed.  
Nevertheless, behind the scenes there have been a series of 
attempts at “dismantling” or chipping away at parts of the law 
since 2005, with roughly one attempt floated every 18 months to 
2 years. They began under Tony Blair with a proposed 
introduction of fees or change to the cost limits (2006), followed 
by an attempt via a Private Members’ Bill to remove Parliament 
from the law (2007) and, under Brown, the proposed removal of 
Monarch and Heir (2010). The Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition then mooted a clampdown on “industrial users” (2012-
2013) and the Conservative government suggested amending the 
veto (2015). Only the removal of the Monarch and Heir, pushed 
through at the end of the 2010 Labour government with little 
publicity, was successful. The other attempts were stopped by a 
powerful barrage of press criticism, opposition with Parliament 
and sustained campaigns to stop them.   
In 2015 the Cameron government announced an Independent 
inquiry into the FOI Act and gave it a remit to examine the 
potential effect on decision-making and costs of the law. Despite 
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fears it would seek to water down the law, the FOI Commission’s 
clear endorsement of the Act in 2016 and the sheer scale of the 
resistance to change by the media and civil society halted any 
attempt to limit it (Worthy and Hazell 2016). However, in late 
2016 the new government was “carefully considering” a proposed 
curtailing of the automatic right to the second stage of appeal 
(MOJ 2016). 
Yet the FOI law has also expanded by reforms and legal rulings. 
There was limited change in 2007-2009 to cover exam bodies and 
then an inclusion of databases in 2012. In 2015 the strategic rail 
authority came under FOI, though owing to a change in 
accounting designation rather than a purposeful change. The 
Independent Commission in 2016 also proposed greater 
publication of pay data and some minor improvements that the 
government endorsed. The new Information Commissioner has 
also announced she is prepared to champion the inclusion of 
private sector bodies directly under FOI (rather than simply using 
contractual clauses on FOI in procurement agreements), 
something the Independent review also suggested (Denham 
2016).  
It is less clear what may happen to some of the lesser EU initiated 
laws on openness. The government has promised a “Great Repeal 
Bill”, a grandfathering law to turn all current EU law into UK law 
in one go. This appears to mean that any EU initiated laws or 
transposed regulations, such as the Public Sector Re-use and 
Environmental Information Regulations, will be kept and 
somehow be preserved. As Brexit means the end of the 
supremacy of EU law over UK law, this does, however, make 
them equally susceptible post-Brexit to repeal or amendment, 
especially if, as suggested, all the new laws carry a five-year sunset 
clause. The Great Repeal Bill will contain a so-called Henry VIII 
clause which “enables government to repeal or amend primary 
legislation by means of a secondary act with limited or no further 
parliamentary scrutiny”, giving ministers power to alter laws 
outside of the legislature’s oversight (Grogan 2016). 
The Open Data agenda, pushed a by a succession of Labour and 
Conservative governments since 2009, will also continue. As 
figure 1 shows, the government is locked in to a series of 
commitments through its OGP Third National Action Plan 
(NAP) meaning the May administration essentially inherits a 
series of ongoing reforms. Looking across the UK’s 3rd OGP 
National Action Plan the top three commitments around 
Beneficial Ownership, extractives transparency and anti-
corruption were very much David Cameron’s personal agenda 
but look set to be continued. In addition, a number of reforms 
from the Cameron administration are still ongoing with, for 
example, the first Beneficial Ownership data only being released 
in June 2016. 
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Figure 1: UK Government’s Third National Action Plan 
2016-2018 
3rd OGP National Action Plan 
Commitment 1: Beneficial ownership 
Commitment 2: Natural resource transparency 
Commitment 3: Anti-Corruption Strategy 
Commitment 4: Anti-Corruption Innovation Hub 
Commitment 5: Open contracting 
Commitment 6: Grants data 
Commitment 7: Elections data 
Commitment 8: Enhanced transparency requirements and revised 
Freedom of Information Act Code of Practice 
Commitment 9: Identifying and publishing core data assets 
Commitment 10: Involving data users in shaping the future of 
open data 
Commitment 11: Better use of data assets 
Commitment 12: GOV.UK 
Commitment 13: Ongoing collaborative approach to open 
government reform 
(Cabinet Office 2016) 
§ 3 –  NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
As well as inheriting an ecosystem and ongoing policies, Theresa 
May’s speeches and actions have indicated a desire to go further. 
In July 2016 May spoke of how she wished to see “more 
transparency, including the full disclosure of bonus targets and 
the publication of ‘pay multiple’ data: that is, the ratio between 
the CEO’s pay and the average company worker’s pay (May 
2016). In terms of concrete policies, so far the government’s 
policies have consisted of 
– A data equality audit of UK political institutions in order to 
‘check how their race affects how they are treated on key issues 
such as health, education and employment, broken down by 
geographic location, income and gender’ and to ‘shine a light on 
how our public services treat people from different backgrounds 
and influence government policy to solve these problems’ (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2016); A push for greater openness over 
executive pay in the private sector, perhaps symbolised by greater 
openness over BBC pay to its senior figures and stars paid over 
£ 150,000 (Telegraph, 14 September 2016); More action on tax 
havens (Times, 26 July 2016)  
The common thread behind such moves is that transparency will 
trigger a chain of actions: the public or users will be interested, 
will use the information and data that is published, and they and 
others can then act upon the data to leverage change. As a result, 
cultural and behavioural change will occur within institutions e.g. 
driving down pay.   
Research increasingly questions each of these assumptions. There 
is no ‘general’ ideal user and, while some openness initiatives 
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generate public interest, others do not. As Roberts (2015) points 
out this chain from asking or accessing data to actually receiving it 
and levering change is a long and weak one. If or whether it can 
lever reforms depends on the context in which the information is 
placed and whether the instruments are available to enforce 
institutional or behaviour change (de Fine Licht 2014). The hope 
behind transparency, that information will rationally influence or 
persuade calculating voters or engaged citizens has not been 
borne out (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Users and voters hold 
‘deeply engrained’ views about government and other institutions 
that are hard to dislodge. Any change due to new information 
appears brief and subject specific (Marvel 2016).   
The example of publishing pay is instructive. Evidence from a 
similar initiatives publishing public sector pay in Canada found 
that disclosure had no effect (Gomez and Wald 2010). Moreover, 
evidence from studies of the private sector point to the possibility 
that disclosure actually increases overall salaries by creating 
upward pressure from colleagues (Schmidt 2011). Such a narrow 
emphasis on levels of pay and benchmarks also obscures other 
important issues around performance (see Jensen and Wald 
1990).   
A further possibility is that new openness policies may be forced 
upon the government. In September 2016, the government 
accepted an amendment to a bill requiring the public reporting of 
‘country-by-country reporting of taxes paid by multi-national 
corporations’. More importantly, in November 2016 the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human ruled in Magyar 
Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary that, within limits, there existed a new 
right to access under the European Convention on Human Rights 
article 10. This applies where there is a public benefit and where 
the requester has a ”public watchdog’ role, a potentially wide 
definition including ’the press…NGOs…authors, academics, 
bloggers and “popular users of social media”. This could include 
information held by bodies currently excluded under FOI, such as 
GCHQ, the security services or election officers, and may also 
weaken the government’s veto and a number of the absolute 
exemptions under FOI (CFOI 15/11/2016).  
§ 4 – AN OPEN PRIME MINISTER? 
Political leaders set the tone and send out signals about the 
openness of their governments (Hazell et al 2010). Table 1 
summarises how the UK’s last three Prime Ministers did and to 
what extent they tried to extend or pushback (i.e. limit) openness. 
Political leaders often declare support for greater openness 
though their enthusiasm, whether real or feigned, often dims 
from a mixture of disappointment, cynicism and wish for less 
exposure and greater control of communications (Berliner 2014). 
There is a natural, if not wholly inevitable, trajectory towards 
secrecy as events, scandal and enemies build: “How many leaders 
have come into office determined to work for more open 
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government, only to end by fretting over leaks, seeking new ways 
to classify documents and questioning the loyalty of outspoken 
subordinates?” (Bok 1986, 177). 
 
UK Prime Ministers and Openness 2005-2016 
PRIME 
MINISTER 
EXTENSION PUSHBACK 
Tony Blair Passed FOI Act in 2000 Fees mooted (2006), 
(tacitly) supported attempt 
to have Parliament 
excluded (2007) 
Gordon 
Brown 
Extension of 30-year rule 
(2009) and slight 
extension of FOI to new 
areas 
Cabinet exclusion mooted, 
Excluded Monarchy from 
FOI (2010) 
David 
Cameron 
OGP especially Open 
Data agenda (2010 
onwards) and Beneficial 
Ownership transparency 
(2013) 
Mooted changes on 
“industrial users” 2012-
2013) and FOI 
commission (2015-2016) 
 
While Tony Blair passed the FOI between 1997 and 2000 he later 
regretted it, describing it as one of his biggest mistakes and 
claimed FOI was being used as a weapon. His successor Gordon 
Brown and then David Cameron both made strong speeches in 
favour of openness and pushed various transparency reforms. 
Cameron perhaps exemplified the competing desire for openness 
and wish for secrecy: while in opposition in 2009 David Cameron 
pledged “true Freedom of Information” through a greater use of 
Open Data and technology, and again in office in 2010 promised 
a “transparency revolution” with aim of making “in time…our 
government one of the most open and transparent in the world” 
(BBC 2009: Prime Minister’s Office 2010). While Cameron 
pushed a series of apparently radical open data reforms from 
2010 onwards, many of which were aimed at the private sector in 
2015 he also set up the FOI Commission described above to 
restrict the Act and described the law at various points as a 
“buggeration factor” and something that was “furring up the 
arteries of government” (Worthy and Hazell 2016).  
So how about new Prime Minister May? May spent six years as 
Home Secretary (i.e. Interior Minister). During that time, she 
pushed transparency within the UK anti-corruption agenda and 
was a key supporter of the long running Hillsborough campaign 
that exposed police corruption in the late 1980s. She has also 
extended FOI to the Police Federation and opened up police 
disciplinary hearings, though some complained May was keen 
only on transparency transparent about her opponents. On a 
personal level May was quick to publish her own tax details 
during her campaign to be Conservative leader. 
On the minus side, May has been in charge of a department with 
a long reputation for secrecy.  Historically, the Home Office sunk 
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many plans for greater openness (Worthy 2017). Under May was 
regularly the third or so in the worst performing departments for 
FOI across UK government (IFG 2016). This is in part due to 
the often difficult and sensitive nature of some of the Home 
Office’s work.  
May herself also has a less than liberal stance elsewhere: critics 
could well discern a tendency to information control and secrecy. 
She sought to hide Border Force cuts from Parliament in 2016 
and, more famously, deflected blame onto officials in 2011 during 
a career threatening crisis (Guardian, 18 April 2016: BBC 2011). 
May’s mode of working is also seen as secretive and closed in the 
Home Office: 
“Mrs May’s preference for working with a close team of 
advisers, often not bothering to share information with 
Number 10 or other ministers… Mrs May’s tendency [is] 
to work with a small team [with a] lack of trust in cabinet 
colleagues” (FT, 12 July 2016).  
The same habits appeared to be carried over into the premiership. 
As one commentator put it: 
“Theresa May survived as home secretary for six years 
partly because she held a tight grip over information 
flows. Perhaps she believes such a model of command-
and-control will translate to the different task of prime 
minister. Perhaps she thinks that the press and MPs can 
be kept in the dark over the UK’s negotiating position” 
(Green, 30 November 2016). 
A leaked note also confirmed that May wished to “draw in 
decisions and settle matters herself” over Brexit (Guardian, 15 
November 2016). In October 2016, the IFG were forced to FOI 
the government to obtain details of the Brexit Cabinet 
subcommittee, information that is normally published proactively 
(IFG 2016). May’s refusal, in response to an FOI request, to 
release her own internet search history over her proposed 
surveillance law also led to a backlash from MPs (Guardian, 30 
January 2016).  
By far the biggest concern is over the repeated attempts by May 
to pass wide-ranging investigatory powers legislation (aka “the 
Snoopers Charter”). This finally became law in November 2016 
after repeated attempts. It gives the right for security services to 
carry out bulk surveillance, essentially legalising the practices 
exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013, and led to “controversy 
around encryption, bulk data and hacking and the right of various 
security services to carry out mass surveillance on the public” 
(Computer world, 2 November 2016). Very serious privacy concerns 
have been raised by Parliament, civil rights groups and lawyers, as 
well as Facebook and Google with the UN privacy commissioner 
also warning it not compliant with international law.  
May’s tendencies towards secrecy are unlikely to be liberalised by 
office. The Brexit process, and May herself, will come under 
unprecedented pressure for openness from the whole variety of 
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“monitory bodies” or “political observatories” that are 
increasingly watching government (Schudson 2015: Keane 2009). 
Whether through FOI requests, Select Committees and 
Questions in Parliament, and leaks from rivals and opponents, is 
unlikely that many secrets will be kept for very long (Posen 2013). 
Already members of the opposition SNP have used FOI to open 
the government’s promises to car-maker Nissan, select 
committees have begun a series of detailed inquiries and leaks, 
accidental or otherwise, from Ministers, consultants and advisors 
have already broken down some of the strict secrecy May 
promised around Brexit.  
§ 4 – AN OPEN BREXIT? 
The constitutional debate over Brexit has focused on the role of 
Parliament and government, given the vagueness around article 
50’s reference to “constitutional arrangements” in the UK where 
the constitution is uncodified. The new May government asserted 
that it was for government to declare and trigger article 50 and 
conduct the subsequent confidential negotiations. Parliament 
countered that the legislature must play a role, given the doctrine 
of Parliamentary sovereignty that underpins the UK’s uncodified 
constitution, and the process must, necessarily, be open. The 
story of Brexit, so far, is of a government seeking secrecy being 
forced to commit to increasing the openness of the process: not 
just about a “hard” versus “Soft” Brexit but a secret versus a 
transparent one.  
The crux of the tricky debate between openness and closure and 
the extent to which Parliament (and the public) has a right to 
know and shape the negotiations. On the one hand, 
confidentiality is recognised in many areas of life where openness 
would inhibit genuine expression, from juries to peace 
negotiations (Chambers 2004: Bok 1986). Academic studies 
offered equivocal evidence. Stasavage’s study of the European 
Council of Ministers found openness can be good at regulating 
behaviour in negotiations but can encourage posturing or 
unnecessary “signalling” to domestic audiences or the pushing of 
actual negotiations to the shadows: 
“[…] when constituents can better observe decision 
making, this has the advantage of disciplining 
representatives, but transparency can also have costs 
involving increased incentives for representatives to 
posture and to ignore private beliefs about appropriate 
policies” (Stasavage 2005, 3).  
Others have pointed to the possible counter-productive effects 
on negotiations of openness in encouraging hidden behaviour 
(Prat 2006). Yet the right and need to be involved, and the 
demands of democratic legitimacy through deliberation, offered 
equally persuasive demands amid so far-reaching a change 
(Chambers 2004). David Allen Green points out this tension is 
Brexit  and Open Governement in the  UK – Ben Worthy 
– 39 – 
International Journal of Open Governments [2017 – Vol 4] 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php/RIGO 
made more complex by the fact that the real source of problems 
and potential audience is not the EU 27 but “her true Brexit 
opponents are the UK’s media and politicians and, by extension, 
the public” who must be persuaded (30 November 2016).  
The government initially sought to cling to the confidentiality 
principle, and use its secretive prerogative power, the vestige of 
Monarchical power that can be used to declare war or authorise 
treaties: 
“The royal prerogative refers to those powers left over 
from when the monarch was directly involved in 
government, powers that now include making treaties, 
declaring war, deploying the armed forces, regulating the 
civil service, and granting pardons.” (Poole 2010, 146).  
The prerogative remains ill-defined with Parliament taking an 
increasing role in a number of the areas including war-making and 
treaty assent. Nevertheless, it remains an area of “constitutional 
exceptionalism”, surrounded with the “mysteries of state, and the 
cloaking of executive power” which is only “semi-impervious to 
norms of legality” (Poole 2010, 154-155). The “defining 
characteristic of the prerogative is that its exercise does not 
require the approval of Parliament” (Poole 2010, 146). The 
government’s seeming tight information control was reinforced 
by constitutional conventions such as collective responsibility that 
binds Ministers to public unanimity and confidentiality. Prime 
Minister May promised strict confidentiality and that “there will 
be ‘no running commentary’ or any substantial disclosure from 
Downing Street” on the negotiations (Green 30 November 2016). 
The government offered some access to the process. In 
September 2016, the new secretary of State for Brexit committed 
to being “as open as I can. More accurately, the Government will 
be as open as they can”. He argued there would be “debates, 
reports by Select Committees and hearings” and he promised: 
“We will certainly match and, hopefully, improve on what the 
European Parliament sees. At given times, that will be tactical, 
I am afraid. I do not want to be boring about it, but this is 
likely to be the most complicated negotiation of modern times. 
It may be the most complicated negotiation of all times. By 
comparison, Schleswig-Holstein is an O-level question. We 
will not always be entirely free agents, but we will be as open 
as we can be.” (House of Lords EU 2016). 
He also spoke of impossibility of secrecy: 
“[…] I will seek to be as open as is possible…Even were I to 
decide that I was going to behave like Rasputin and keep it all 
entirely secret, I would fail. It would not be possible… other 
Governments would do it. In the Government’s own interest, 
it is a better idea to be more open than is perhaps traditional, 
but always subject to the overriding point that we cannot pre-
empt the negotiation” (House of Lords EU 2016). 
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In October, the report from the House of Lords EU select 
Committee took a rather stronger view of what right Parliament 
had (2016). 
One of the key objectives of parliamentary scrutiny is to ensure 
transparency – to cast a light on the actions of the executive. It is, 
we suggest, essential that many elements of the forthcoming 
negotiations – for instance, negotiations affecting acquired rights, 
or future cooperation between UK and EU police forces – should 
be conducted transparently (House of Lords EU 2016a). 
It went on to acknowledge the difficulty around complex 
negotiations and the need to not “show a hand” early: “at the 
same time, some of the most important and complex aspects of 
the forthcoming negotiations on a new relationship will be 
sensitive… and will require a high degree of confidentiality” 
(House of Lords 2016a). 
Some critics were less than convinced by the need for 
government secrecy, in part because it appeared to them that the 
government were not shielding a plan but seeking to hide the lack 
of a plan and possible divisions within government “the 
government does not want to involve parliament or the courts 
any more than it can get away with… Perhaps it thinks it will lose 
votes or that Brexit itself will be delayed. Or perhaps it is seeking 
to be shielded from embarrassment if its lack of thought and 
capability about Brexit are exposed” (Green, 10 October 2016). A 
leading think-tank also warned the government that “silence is 
not a strategy” (IFG 2016a). In November 2016, a leaked memo 
by Deloitte revealed that “no common strategy has emerged” for 
Brexit and that ministers were split on the issue (Guardian, 15 
November 2016). The government’s justification and card game 
analogy was also criticized: 
“Those who say the government should not reveal its hand are 
mistaking Brexit negotiations for a backroom game of cards. 
Obscurity and secrecy are the enemies of a sustainable Brexit. 
The aim of the negotiations is not to defeat any opponent (and 
Britain’s ‘opponents’ know the strengths and weaknesses of 
the country’s ‘hand’ as much as the UK does), but to ensure 
there are agreements that work in practice, are acceptable to 
those who have an interest, and have legitimacy in principle. 
The best way – indeed, the only way – for Brexit to be a 
success is through openness and accountability” (Green, 10 
October 2016). 
It was pointed out that “Brussels probably knows the strengths 
and weaknesses of the UK negotiating position better than the 
UK itself” (Green, 30 November 2016). Indeed, the EU 27, from 
Prime Minister and Presidents to ambassadors, have already 
offered a “flow of information about Brexit” and “a detailed and 
helpful running commentary” that has exposed the UK’s “lack of 
a practical plan” (Green, 30 November 2016). As a consequence, 
the secrecy is for the government’s domestic audience: 
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“Ministers know that ‘making a success of Brexit’ is a domestic 
political objective. And so, the lack of communication serves 
as a way of […] structuring expectations [and] cloak[ing] the 
government’s ongoing inability to form a settled view on 
which of the available outcomes is preferable” (Green, 30 
November 2016). 
The government’s plan for a “closed”, prerogative based Brexit 
came unstuck in in November 2016 when the High Court ruled in 
R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] 
that, in passing the European Communities Act 1972 and the 
constitutional rights in entailed, government ceded its prerogative 
powers and Parliament, not the executive, must have the ultimate 
say (Elliott 2016). In the wake of the high court ruling, one legal 
scholar argued that “Parliament must be given clear rights to 
notice, to comment on key negotiating positions and draft 
agreement text, and to a response from the Government to its 
comments” “(King 7 Nov 2016). After the November High 
Court judgement greater openness made inevitable:  
“eventually, the government will have to adopt a broader, 
more collaborative and more open approach to the process, as 
there is no alternative to making a success of it” (FT, 4 
November 2016). 
In the wake of the judgment, the government also committed to 
providing the same openness to UK MPs as the EU Parliament-
though this carried a twist, as EU MEPs currently have only 
‘closed oversight’ through heavily protected reading rooms or 
meetings that the UK government promised to emulate. This can 
mean documents are restricted to certain MPs in a certain time 
and place, with no disclosure, copying or reproduction allowed:  
“[…] arrangements lead to parliamentary oversight taking 
place behind closed doors or more simply stated, to closed 
oversight. Closed oversight means that both the manner in 
which oversight is conducted and the results of oversight are 
not public to the other members of parliament and to the 
general public.” (Abazi 2016, 12). 
As of this moment, much depends on the Supreme Court ruling 
in early December 2016. 
§ 5 – DEVOLUTION AND BREXIT 
Looking further into the future, the impact of Brexit could get 
more complicated. Since the 1990s Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales have been given representative bodies, a process that 
reflected but also accelerated the creation of distinct territorial 
politics across the UK (Jeffery 2009). Cameron and now May 
have also strongly pushed greater regional government for the 
English regions, with new city and regional elected mayors and 
combined ‘super’ local authorities (Blunkett et al 2016). More 
power to the nation and regions is a solution both to the different 
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Brexit votes (Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to Remain) 
and a means of offering citizens greater control following a result 
seen as a backlash against remote elites (Inglehart and Norris 
2016). This may have two effects. 
First, devolved bodies can be party to negotiations and involved 
in accessing details through bodies such as the regular meetings of 
heads of devolved bodies and promised sub-groups: ‘the 
devolved governments and legislatures should enjoy formal 
participation in the consultation process in rough parity with the 
Westminster Parliament’ (King, 7 November 2016). This will make 
the process more collaborative but, by including more actors 
(some of whom are opposed to Brexit) may make it more likely to 
leak. 
Second, in the longer term the new elites and centres may 
develop their own agendas and polices. The devolved Scottish 
government and Northern Irish Executive have both drawn up 
separate Open Data agendas and plans along different time scales 
(Worthy 2015a). The Scottish government already has its own 
separate FOI legislation that has been extended further than the 
UK law to leisure trusts and certain privately run schools. 
Scotland’s Open Data plan for 2015-2017 aimed for a baseline of 
re-publishable data and a new rediscovery website, with a promise 
of an iterative Open Data strategy developed with Scottish civil 
society (Scottish Government 2015). The Northern Irish 
Executive has established its own Open Data roadmap covering 
2015 and 2018 with an aim of becoming ‘digital by default’ and 
creating a single Northern Ireland Open Data node (Department 
of Finance 2015). The civil society networks supporting Open 
Data also has separate networks covering the devolved 
institutions. Though it is not clear what divergence will result, the 
implications are of policy deviance in motion.  
Other institutions may also follow suit: The UK Parliament has 
also drawn its own Digital Democracy agenda including 
publishing voting details and records as Open Data by 2016 and, 
more far-reaching, pushing for online voting by 2020 (Digital 
Democracy 2015). Stronger English local government may also 
provide a site of greater innovation. Despite the central attempts 
at control, local authorities have also experimented with a whole 
host of bottom up initiatives working with a range of groups and 
other public bodies (LGA 2012: Worthy 2015). Officials in local 
government also display higher knowledge and awareness of 
Open Data and greater use of both their and own and others” 
data in their everyday work. A set of devolved “plus” institutions 
could easily make some very interesting regional variation in 
openness across the UK. The UK government’s 3rd NAP 
recognises this by promising “ongoing collaborative approach to 
open government reform” though it is not clear whether policies 
will be merged or overlap. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are various scenarios for how Brexit and Open 
Government can unfold. Perhaps the best-case scenario, from the 
viewpoint of the government, is that openness policies pushed by 
government become an identifying mark for the new 
administration. The new policies could help the Prime Minister 
establish a distinct reform programme while re-energising the 
government and, given the emphasis on the private sector, the 
economy at a precarious time. Greater openness around Brexit 
itself may help to legitimise, and even democratise, the process 
and bind some of the national, societal and inter-institutional 
fractures opened by the referendum. 
The worst-case scenario would see openness consumed by Brexit. 
Policies would stall with only superficial change actually masking 
inaction or even pushback, as seen with the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers legislation. The Brexit process could pitch a 
secretive “bunker mentality” prime minister and government 
against a legislature (and perhaps the devolved assemblies and 
courts) seeking to force them open, with uncertain results for 
who controls the process of leaving the EU. As an unelected 
takeover Prime Minister with a small majority, May is likely to 
face party instability and a relatively short-time in office (Worthy 
2016). There may be less time, but more need, for openness than 
she thinks. 
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